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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JEROME WALLACE SMITH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890008-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Statement of the Issues, Jurisdictional Statement, 
Statement of the Case, and Statement of the Facts are set forth in 
Appellant's opening brief at pages iv thru 7. Appellant takes this 
opportunity to respond to the arguments set forth in Points IA and B 
of Respondent's brief. The remaining arguments are adequately 
covered in Appellant's opening brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A careful reading of the facts in this case establishes 
that the officer seized Appellant's automobile. The officer 
characterized his actions as "stopping" the vehicle, and, regardless 
of whether he used his overhead lights or a spotlight to effectuate 
the stop, a seizure occurred when Appellant's ability to drive away 
was blocked by the police vehicle. 
The officer did not articulate a reasonable basis for 
stopping the Appellant. The behavior of the person leaning inside 
the window who then walked away is similar to the nervous behavior 
in Mendoza and Schlosser and should not be given weight. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DETENTION OF MR, SMITH AND THE 
SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE VIOLATED THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 
A. OFFICER SMITH "SEIZED" APPELLANT. 
In arguing that no seizure occurred in this case, the 
State ignores the clear testimony of Officer Smith. 
OFFICER: That was the reason I stopped him was no 
signal. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Did you cite him for the 
right-hand turn? 
OFFICER: Yes. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: When you stopped him, you parked 
right behind him. Is that correct? 
OFFICER: As indicated, yes. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And his vehicle could not have 
moved one way or the other; is that correct? 
OFFICER: I don't believe he could have backed out 
of there without either striking my vehicle or 
getting close to it. 
T. 14. Unlike the facts in Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965 
(Utah App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (1987), the 
Appellant's path was blocked by the police officer and he was 
therefore not free to leave in the instant case.1 Regardless of 
1 In Layton City, the officer followed defendant into a 
construction site; there is no indication that the officer blocked 
the driver's ability to leave as in the case currently before the 
Court. In a Memorandum Decision, this Court held that no stop 
occurred under the circumstances in Layton City. 
whether the officer used his overhead lights or his spotlight to 
effectuate the stop, a stop occurred when the officer blocked 
Mr. Smith's ability to drive away. 
Various courts have found that a seizure occurred under 
the fourth amendment where an officer blocked a defendant's ability 
to drive away. In People v. Guy, 329 N.W.2d 435 (Mich. App. 1983), 
an officer drove by a parked car. The car then pulled out from the 
curb and drove into a driveway of a house. The officer returned and 
parked his police car so as to partially block the driveway, then 
approached the car. Under such circumstances, the court held that 
the officer's actions "clearly constituted a detention." j[d. at 440. 
In United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1987), 
an officer pulled into a driveway as the defendant was backing out, 
blocking defendant's path. The defendant stopped, got out of his 
car and gave the officer identification without being asked. The 
Ninth Circuit overruled the trial court's decision that a seizure 
had not occurred2, stating in part: 
Under the circumstances, Deputy Hedrick's 
authority and conduct provided Kerr no alternative 
except an encounter with the police. 
Id. at 1387. The Court also noted that the defendant's perception 
of his inability to leave as evidenced by his disclosure that he had 
no driver's license, an admission against his interest, should be 
considered in determining that a seizure occurred. See also United 
2
 The Kerr Court noted that "[w]e review de novo the 
district court's decision that no fourth amendment seizure 
occurred." Kerr, 817 F.2d at 1386. 
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States v, Zukas, 843 P.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1988) (parking car in front 
of airplane so as to block access to runway, then approaching pilot 
and asking for identification and registration is a seizure). 
In this case, where the officer blocked the defendant's 
ability to drive away (T. 9, 14), then approached the defendant's 
vehicle and asked for identification, a reasonable person in 
Mr. Smith's position would have believed he was not free to leave. 
Running the warrants check is further indication that a seizure 
occurred. See United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(officer seized defendant when officer asked defendant to come to 
police car so he could run warrants check); State v. Johnson, 771 
P.2d 326 (Utah App. 1989) (cert, granted June 12, 1989) (defendant 
seized when officer took defendant's name and birthdate "and 
expected her to wait while he ran warrants check"). 
Although the State claims that "Officer Smith did not do 
anything that caused Defendant to take this action [stop his vehicle 
in the parking lot] and did not use his overhead lights" 
(Respondent's brief at 8), such a statement ignores Officer Smith's 
statements that he stopped the vehicle (T. 14, 52-53, 15, 41-2) as 
well as the officer's uncertainty as to whether he used his overhead 
lights or his spotlight to effectuate the stop. 
OFFICER: I don't remember whether I turned on my 
overheads, or used my spotlight. 
PROSECUTOR: And what point would you have done 
that? At what point in space here? 
OFFICER: When I'm approaching to stop any 
vehicle, use the radio to call out, work the 
lights and/or the hand-held spotlight. 
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T. 41-2. The State's position that Officer Smith did nothing to 
effectuate the stop also ignores the officer's statements regarding 
the grounds for the stop. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: When you got out of the vehicle, 
and Mr. Smith got out of the vehicle, did you tell 
him why you were stopping him? 
OFFICER: I did tell him during our conversation 
that he didn't signal. 
T. 52. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: You testified that you pulled 
him over, and stopped him for the turn signal; is 
that correct for the failure to turn? 
OFFICER: Yes. That's common terminology. 
T. 53. 
B. OFFICER SMITH DID NOT ARTICULATE A REASONABLE 
BASIS FOR STOPPING APPELLANT. 
The State points out that "the common thread" in cases 
where the Utah Supreme Court has found that the officer lacked a 
reasonable articulable suspicion to detain an individual "is an 
officer stopping an individual on the luck-of-the-draw that 
something could be wrong." Respondent's brief at 14. This is 
precisely such a case; the officer had a hunch and hoped to be lucky 
enough to find something criminal to pursue when he stopped 
Appellant. 
Although a police officer is entitled to rely on his 
experience (see Respondent's brief at 13), he must nevertheless 
articulate specific facts which, when viewed in light of the 
officer's experience, give rise to a basis for the stop. A stop 
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cannot be justified solely on an officer's statement that because he 
is a police officer, he knew something was amiss. In the instant 
case, Officer Smith could not articulate actions or facts which gave 
rise to a suspicion as the result of his experience. 
The State's reliance on the officer's observation of an 
individual leaning into the Defendant's car (Respondent's brief at 
15) as offering a basis for the stop is misplaced. First, although 
Officer Smith assumed the person leaning inside the car left because 
the officer approached (T. 39), the officer did not testify that the 
person looked up or looked at him. Instead, the person simply 
walked away from the car (T. 39). There are a number of reasonable 
explanations, totally unrelated to the officer's arrival, for 
walking away from the car. 
In addition, the behavior of the individual in walking 
away from the car, even in light of the officer's experience, has an 
endless number of reasonable and legal explanations. On September 
nights throughout Salt Lake City, individuals lean inside car 
windows to chat with neighbors, say goodbye to friends, hand the 
checkbook to a husband going to the store. Nothing about this 
behavior makes it suspect. 
In State v. Mendoza, 738 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1987), the 
Utah Supreme Court refused to give weight to the "nervous behavior" 
of a car's occupants in determining whether officers had a 
reasonable suspicion to justify a detention. And, in State v. 
Schlosser, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (May 17, 1989), the Utah Supreme 
Court again refused to give weight to the nervous behavior of an 
- 6 -
individual, pointing out that: 
when confronted with a traffic stop, it is not 
uncommon for drivers and passengers alike to be 
nervous and excited . . . 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 40. The Court concluded that: 
[a] search based on such common gestures and 
movements is a mere "hunch," not an articulable 
suspicion that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. 
JEd. 
Although it is not clear in this case that the person who 
walked away did so because the officer approached, even if that were 
the case, nervousness around officers does not give rise to a 
reasonable articulable suspicion so as to justify a stop. 
Furthermore, the fourth amendment protects citizens against 
unreasonable detentions and, even under State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 
616 (Utah 1987) (per curiam), and United States v. Merritt, 732 F.2d 
223 (5th Cir. 1984), a citizen is free to walk away from an officer 
where the officer does not have a reasonable articulable suspicion 
to justify a detention. Exercising fourth amendment rights by 
walking away from an officer where the officer has no basis for 
detaining that person does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion 
under the fourth amendment that criminal activity is afoot. 
The State did not sustain its burden of establishing that 
the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion so as to justify 
the stop. 
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CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Smith 
respectfully requests this Court reverse his conviction and remand 
the case to the trial court with an order of dismissal or 
suppression of the illegally seized evidence, or, in the 
alternative, remand the case for rehearing on the motion to suppress. 
Submitted this 1~7 day of July, 1989. 
FRANCES M. PALACIOS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
^<M- C cikQf 
;JOAN C . WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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